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INTRODUCTION
After the Great East Japan Earthquake took place in Fukushima in
2011, Japan abandoned nuclear power plants. However, it now plans to
reactivate them.
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) establishes
regulations via ministerial ordinances to achieve statutory goals. Cases
before several district courts seek to know whether the government’s grant
of permission to reactivate nuclear power plants is arbitrary and
capricious.
This Article examines issues pertaining to the grant of permission for
the establishment of nuclear power plants and considers cases on the
matter, because administrative discretion results in important
developments in environmental law from a comparative law perspective.
It is important to examine the decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court
on administrative discretion in Japan, U.S. environmental law, and several
cases concerning the establishment of nuclear power plants in Japan.
I. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CASE IN JAPAN
Most recently, the judiciary reviewed the reactivation of the nuclear
power plant in 2017. Accordingly, this section looks at the decision of the
High Court in the 2017 case. The Osaka High Court1 rejected the request
for a temporary injunction against the operation of a nuclear power plant
that the government had closed down after the Great East Japan
Earthquake. A newspaper reported this case dramatically, which shows the
influence of this case on decisions of other inferior Courts.2
A. Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Case in 2017
The Takahama Nuclear Power Plant started operations in 1985 after
the government granted permission to operate it in 1980. The Great
Earthquake caused the release of a massive radioactive substance in 2012,
after the nuclear power plant melted down and a hydrogen explosion
occurred. This incident caused nuclear power plants to stop operations one
by one. Unit 4 of the Takahama nuclear power plant stopped in July 2011,
1. Osaka Koto Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] March 28, 2017, Heisei 28 (ra)
no. 677, 2334 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 4 (Japan).
2. FUKUI SHIMBUN ONLINE, Genpatsu sashitome sosho [Injunction case of
nuclear power reactor] (Sept. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/H9DX-8H37. See also
Takahama reactors may soon restart after court overturns injunction, JAPAN
TIMES (May 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/R3KT-GQUN.
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followed by Unit 3 in February 2012. In 2012, the Japanese parliament
amended the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Materials, Nuclear
Fuel Materials, and Reactors.3 In order to reactivate the nuclear power
plant, an applicant must submit a request for permission to the Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA) to see if it meets safety standards and to make
an application to modify facilities to meet the new standards.
In July 2013, the Kansai Electric Power Co. submitted an application
to modify the facility and sought permission to plan the construction and
correction of the nuclear plant according to the safety regulations for Units
3 and 4.4
In December 2014, local residents brought an action to seek a
temporary injunction against the operation of Units 3 and 4. They argued
that their interests were based on personal rights in Article 13 of the
Constitution and sought the exclusion of interference because nuclear
contamination would cause damage to the lives and health of local
residents.5
The Fukui District Cour6 accepted and granted a temporary injunction.
Units 3 and 4 stopped operations in February 2016. The Osaka High Court
vacated it and focused on NRA safety standards. The Osaka High Court
admitted that safety regulations should prevent a “remote” possibility of
concrete danger, but noted that while reviewing a concrete risk of
substantial danger, the reviewing Court would see if the danger is
controlled well enough that it may be ignored by socially conventional
wisdom. The Osaka High Court thought the NRA safety standards were
reasonable enough to achieve the level of safety required for a nuclear
power plant to operate.7
Although this case was considered civil litigation, its decision was
similar to a decision in an administrative adjudication. In Japan, residents
have two routes to seek an injunction against a nuclear power plant. As
shown in the civil case, one way is for the local residents to pursue civil
3. Kakugenryo Bussitsu, Kakunenryou Bussitsu oyobi Gensiro no kiseini
kansuru Houritsu, Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear
Fuel Material and Reactors, currently Law No. 42 of 2016. (Japan).
4. Takahama nuclear power plants are composed of four units. Unit 1 started
in 1974, and Unit 2 started in 1975. Unit 3 and Unit 4 started in 1985. KANSAI
ELECTRIC POWER, Nuclear Power Information on Units 3 and 4 of Takahama
Power Station (List of Topics), https://perma.cc/2BR5-XWZM.
5. The argument for personal rights includes the right to health, derived from
their right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], Nov. 3, 1946, art. 13 (Japan).
6. Fukui Chiho Saibansho [Fukui Dist. Ct.] April, 14, 2015, Heisei 26 (yo)
no. 31, 2290 HANREIJIHOU [HANJI] 13 (Japan).
7. Justin McCurry, Fukushima operator can restart nuclear reactors at
world's biggest plant, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/MS4H76B3.
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litigation alleging that permission granted to a nuclear power plant would
infringe on their personal rights protected by the Constitution. The other
method is administrative litigation, by which they can seek the revocation
of permission granted to the nuclear power plant.
The civil case shows drastic reforms after the Great Earthquake in
2011 and followed the Ikata decision that is discussed in Section II(D),
which alleviated the burden of proof on local residents in administrative
litigation.
In the Ikata decision, the Supreme Court noted an imbalance of
scientific knowledge between electric companies and residents. Thus, the
Ikata decision noted that, in general, a plaintiff must prove administrative
adjudication is unreasonable, but in this case, the Atomic Energy
Commission is obligated to prove concrete standards for review and
procedure by substantial proof and materials. If an administrative agency
can’t perform its duty, the unreasonableness of administrative adjudication
is presumed. The Osaka High court followed the Ikata decision, and noted
further: If an administrative agency meets its burden of proof, the burden
shifts to plaintiffs to prove uncertainty.
Although the term “remote” in this decision means “just in case,” the
Osaka High Court held that rather than a remote danger, a substantial and
concrete danger was necessary. The decision led to the formation of the
myth of absolute safety of the nuclear power plant. After 2011, this myth
was discarded, and the government implemented detailed safety measures
based on experiences of serious accidents. The judiciary can no longer
focus on a “remote possibility.”8
Judicial control of administrative discretion is not confined to granting
permission for the establishment or reactivation of nuclear power plants.
Thus, before analyzing any further, it is necessary to review cases of
administrative discretion in other fields. Section II illustrates that the
development of administrative discretion in Japan is not as unique as nonJapanese researchers assume it to be.
B. Missiles from North Korea
After the High Court decision, Units 3 and 4 were reactivated in May
and June, 2017, respectively. Local residents persevered and sought an
injunction by other means. In March 2018, the Osaka District Court
dismissed complaints that missiles from North Korea were likely to attack
8. Shigenori Matsui, T-Rex, Jurassic Park and Nuclear Power: Nuclear
Power Plants and the Courts After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, 42 WILLIAM
& MARY ENVTL. LAW & AND POLICY REV. 145, 182-183 (2017).
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the Takahama nuclear power plant and cause serious, extensive
radioactive contamination in Kansai. The judge explained that the danger
was not so imminent that it was necessary to stop operations of Units 3
and 4 of the nuclear power plant.9 Local residents now seek temporary
injunction orders by bringing different arguments.10
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN JAPAN
Administrative discretion is an important part of the study of the
nuclear power plant permission case. It also raises important issues from
a comparative law perspective.11
Much controversy surrounds administrative discretion to establish
administrative standards and make administrative dispositions. In abstract
cases, the legislature provides general language in the statutes regarding
standards for disposition for the general public. The legislature has
established administrative agencies with a limited power to create
administrative regulations within their fields of expertise.12 It is still unclear
how administrative agencies interpret statutes through ministerial
ordinances. It is also unclear how administrative dispositions should be
rendered or if permission for applications should be granted in specific
cases.
Before World War II, German law greatly influenced Japanese law. At
that time, administrative law focused on limiting the governmental power
that infringed upon the interests and freedoms of the people. There were two
mainstream theories used to recognize administrative discretion in Japan.
The first theory focused on administrative discretion where administrative
agencies interpreted the text of the statutes in concrete cases.13 The second
theory focused on the choices of administrative agencies from several
administrative dispositions provided by statute.14
9. Osaka Chiho Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] March, 30, 2018. Kanden
Takahama Genpatsu 4 gouki ga saikadou, Restart Takahama nuclear reactor
Kansai Electric Power Co., NIKKEI SHIMBUN (May 17, 2017), https://perma.cc
/JZ4U-PFHF.
10. Utility eyes NRA screening nod for new nuclear reactor in Shimane, THE
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Feb. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/77W5-BPT3.
11. UGA KATSUYA, GYOSEIHO TEKISUTO [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT] 161
(Yuhikaku 2012); Y. SHIBAIKE, GYOSEIHO [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 63 (Yuhikaku
2016); HASHIMOTO HIROYUKI & SAKURAI KEIKO, GYOSEIHO [ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW] 151-52 (Kobundo 2016).
12. UGA KATSUYA, GYŌSEIHŌ TEKISUTO [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT] 14146 (Yuhikaku 2012).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 163-64.
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After World War II, administrative law was influenced by U.S. theories.
Japanese administrative law mixed U.S. and German administrative law
theories.
This Article examines the decisions of the Japanese Supreme Court in
terms of important environmental law doctrines in combination with U.S.
theories of environmental law.
A. Rule-making and Lawmaking Power in Japan
Unlike the presidential veto power in the U.S., the Japanese Prime
Minister has no legal power to reject a bill submitted by the parliament
upon his signature. The parliament cannot give the administrative agency
carte blanche in lawmaking power because Article 41 of the Japanese
Constitution gives sole lawmaking power to the Diet.15 When the Diet
leaves a gap in a statute, the administrative agency is expected to fill the
gap.16 The grounds for the Diet to delegate its lawmaking power to an
administrative agency are found in Article 73(6), which empowers the
agency to “enact cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this
Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions
in such cabinet orders unless authorized by such law.”17 Accordingly,
Article 73(6) authorizes the Diet to delegate provided that its purpose is
clear, the standard is fixed, and the scope of delegation is clearly limited.18
The Constitution considers the discretion limited if the Diet has the ability
to withdraw or modify the delegation at any time.
In a famous administrative regulatory case involving a Japanese
sword, one citizen filed for permission to register a western style sword to
have in his home.19 A Japanese statute prohibits people from having guns
and swords in their home unless applicant registers them as “beautiful
museum objects.”20 The administrative regulations provide an exception
for Japanese swords but not for western style sabers.
The Japanese Supreme Court held that its delegation was
constitutional.21 Some swords may have cultural value as museum objects.
Japanese people cannot own swords, but the statute provided an exception
15. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 41 (Japan).
16. UGA, supra note 12, at 143.
17. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 73(6) (Japan).
18. TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI
TAKAHASHI, & KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI,KENPŌ II [CONSTITUTION II]
76–78,418 (Yuhikaku 2012) .(Japan) [hereinafter NONAKA ET AL.II].
19. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] Feb. 1, 1990, Showa 63 (Gyo tsu) no.
163, 44(2) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 369 (Japan).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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in the register system for the reservation of swords. The Japanese Court
reviewed the purpose and the meaning of the statute and held that the
Director General of the Agency for Cultural Affairs had regulation
authority. In doing so, the Director’s authority was limited to the appraisal
standards for Japanese swords and what is considered valuable as
registered beautiful museum objects.
In another case, the Japanese Supreme Court weighed in on a statute
involving child-rearing allowance.22 The statute states that the Government
provides support for children whose parents are divorced or whose father
passes away.23 Administrative regulations support the mother who bears a
child without legal marriage unless there is legal acknowledgement by the
father.24 Under the Japanese Civil Code, legitimacy of a child is legally
presumed when there is a married couple or when there is an unmarried
mother who bears a child. 25 However, legitimacy is not presumed in
circumstances involving an unmarried father and a child. The statute for
child-rearing allowance only provides support for children of divorce, not
for children of an unmarried couple.
The government denied the application for a child who was legally
acknowledged by the father. The Japanese Supreme Court determined the
administrative agency regulations that excluded children who were legally
acknowledged by their fathers were illegal. Further, the Court found the
distinction between married but divorced mothers and unmarried mothers
to be unreasonable.26
B. Definition of Administrative Discretion in Japan
Administrative discretion is the authority of an administrative agency
to set regulatory standards or make administrative decisions within the
scope set forth in its enabling legislation or other statutes. The grounds for
administrative discretionary power are agency expertise and policy
judgment. Discretion is exercised in administrative rule-making and
administrative planning. There are two types of administrative planning:
One is legally binding, such as land readjustment projects, and the other
22. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 2002, Heisei 8 (Gyo tsu) no. 42, 56(1)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 246 (Japan).
23. Jidou Fuyou Teate Hou [Child Rearing Allowance Law], Law No. 238 of
1961 (Japan), art. 4(1)V.
24. Jidou Fuyou Teate Hou Sikou Rei [Enforcement Order of the Child
Rearing Allowance Law], Ordinance No. 405 of 1961, art.1-2(3) (rev. 2008).
25. MINPO [CIVIL CODE] Law No. 89 of 1896 (Japan), art. 772.
26. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 31, 2002, Heisei 8 (Gyo tsu) no. 42, 56(1)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 246 (Japan).
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type serves only as a guideline with no legally binding power, such as a
highway improvement project. If administrative plans restrict rights or
establish duties of a citizen, they are legally binding and need to be
established by statute. If not, they do not have legal binding power.
The scope of such discretion is subject to the terms set forth in the
agency’s enabling statutes and, in some cases, leads to judicial review
because of intentional or unintentional “uncertainty” in the term.
For example, in 1997, Japan’s Supreme Court reviewed the term
“reasonable price,” which was referenced in Article 71 of the Compulsory
Purchase of Land Act.27 In this case, the Land Expropriation Committee
decided upon the compulsory purchase of a particular parcel of privately
owned land. The land had some uncertainty with regards to the existence
of a lease tenant contract and the ratio of leasehold tenant rights, and the
committee ultimately decided upon a 40% leasehold tenant right. The
Court stated the following:
[The Court] should not examine or judge whether or not the
Expropriation Committee has abused its discretionary power
when making a determination on compensation, but rather, the
Court should determine a fair amount of compensation as of the
time of the committee’s determination, objectively, and if there is
any difference between the amount of compensation determined
by the Court and that determined by the committee, the Court
should declare the committee’s determination to be illegal and fix
a fair amount of compensation.28
The Court held that the “reasonable price” of the compulsory purchase
should be objectively fixed and appropriately determined based on the
experience of reasonable people and socially accepted ideas. 29
Accordingly, the Court determined that the term “reasonable price,” as set
forth in the agency’s regulations authorizing the committee’s work, did
not give such broad discretion to the Land Expropriation Committee. Not
reviewing whether administrative adjudication is arbitrary and capricious,
the Court invalidated the Land Expropriation Committee’s price of
compensation.

27. Tochi Shuyo hou [The Compulsory Purchase of Land Act], Law No. 219
of 1951.
28. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 28, 1997, Heisei 11 (Gyo tsu) no. 11,
51(1) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 147 (Japan).
29. Id.
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C. Classic Theories of Administrative Discretionary Power in Japan
In Japan, the legislature authorizes an administrative agency to
exercise its power through statutes. In some cases, the terms of the statute
are unclear. The ambiguity in the statutory authority includes how and
when administrative discretionary power is legally exercised. Generally,
the notion of discretion has been characterized by its requirements
(Youken). Accordingly, the effects of discretion (Kouka) have been related
to the level of judicial review. There are also concepts of reviewable and
non-reviewable discretionary power.30
To clarify this distinction, Kyoto University Professor Souichi Sasaki
argued that administrative discretionary power was permitted in cases
where an agency’s interpretation involves an element or requirement as
provided by statute.31 Simply put, the agency is granted discretionary
power to apply a condition or requirement to a fact (referred to as Youken
Sairyou in Japanese). For example, the legislature provided general text in
public servant law that prohibits the delinquency of public officials;
however, it is unclear what kind of action by a public official would
constitute “delinquency.” The administrative agency has the discretion to
determine when a public official’s statement is “certain” and in doing so,
may determine the grounds for discipline.
On the other hand, Professor Tatsukichi Minobe of Tokyo University
stated that administrative agencies had broad discretionary power to either
select the procedure for such a disposition or not to decide at all. This
theory is referred to as Kouka (Sentaku) Sairyou in Japanese. For example,
in a public official’s disciplinary case, the agency would have
discretionary power to choose between punitive dismissal, pay cuts,
suspension, or a warning as punishment.
The theories of these two professors may differ in some cases and lead
to similar conclusions in others. These ideas reflect the German public law
theories at a time when public law focused on how to restrict the
government’s infringement on the rights and protect freedoms of the
people.32
Prior to World War II, Japanese public law scholars such as Sasaki
and Minobe did not consider social rights in Japan. Thus, Minobe
approved of the unfettered discretionary power of an agency’s disposition
as an independent power to provide for the beneficial interests of the
30. UGA, supra note 11, at 163; SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 65-66; SAKURAI
& HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 105-114.
31. Id.
32. Yuichiro Tsuji, Administrative Action and the Succession of Illegality, 67
TSUKUBA J. L. & POL. 11, 14-19 (2016).
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people but rejected invasive administrative dispositions that restricted the
freedom of the people.33
A 1961 Supreme Court decision shows that the distinction between the
views of Sasaki and Minobe were blurred after the new Constitution was
established in 1947.34 Here, the Supreme Court reviewed the disciplinary
dismissal of a teacher in a public junior high school. The educational
committee in the locale ordered him to move to a different school. The
teacher argued that the committee’s disposition was illegal and chose to
remain at the original school. This resulted in an order for disciplinary
dismissal. The teacher brought suit to revoke the dismissal.
In this case, the educational committee convened for the disciplinary
dismissal with only 30 minutes’ notice and did not open it to the public. The
old Article 34(4) of the Educational Committee Act stated that venue, date,
and agenda should be provided at least three days beforehand, except in an
emergency. The issue was whether convening the committee for the
disciplinary dismissal in this context constituted an “emergency.”
The Supreme Court supported the committee’s discretionary power to
interpret this provision and determined that convening the committee was
an emergency that did not require the three-day prior notice.35
Another illustrative case is the Alan McLean decision of 1978 in
which John Alan McLean entered Japan as an English teacher on a oneyear visa in May 1969. 36 During his stay, he participated in a
demonstration of a Japanese citizens’ group against the Vietnam War.
After one year, he applied for an extension of stay for 120 days in May
1970, but the Ministry of Justice denied his request.
The statute provided that the Ministry “can” permit the extension of a
visa if it thinks it is appropriate and there is a valid reason. The Supreme
Court held that the rights provided in Chapter 3 of the Japanese
Constitution37 are guaranteed for non-Japanese people to whatever extent
possible. The Ministry possesses the prerogative power to make decisions
to approve visas and grant visa extensions, taking into account the
subject’s political activities in Japan. The Ministry, therefore, retains
broad discretion, and the Court will hold its decisions to be illegal only if
33. UGA, supra note 11, at 164; SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 69-73; SAKURAI
& HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 105-106.
34. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] April 27, 1961, Showa 34 (o) no. 851, 15(4)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 928 (Japan).
35. Id.
36. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 1978, Showa 50 (Gyo tsu) no. 120,
32(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 1223 (Japan).
37. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], Nov. 3, 1946, Ch. 3
(Japan) (List of fundamental rights).
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the disposition is based on clearly erroneous and unreasonable findings of
fact that lack validity under socially accepted common sense.
Following the Minobe theory, the Court denied discretionary power
when an administrative disposition restricts rights or freedoms of the
people. The Court decided, however, that the right to enter Japan or extend
one’s visa is not a protected right for non-Japanese people.38
The Minobe and Sasaki theories illustrate extreme positions for
administrative discretionary power. Today, mandatory discretion refers to
what a reasonable person would decide based on common sense and
socially acceptable values, subject to judicial review. The legality of
unfettered discretionary power is subject to judicial review, while its
validity for administrative disposition is not.39
D. Article 30 of the Japanese Administrative Case Litigation Act
Today, Article 30 of the Japanese Administrative Case Litigation Act
(JACLA or Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou in Japanese) does not distinguish
between these theories. 40 Article 30 gives the court power to vacate
administrative adjudication when it is arbitrary and capricious. The Courts
can revoke an original administrative disposition when it is made beyond
the agency’s discretionary power or when there is an abuse of such power.
Japanese environmental law studies focus on cases in which
administrative dispositions have been determined by the Courts to be
beyond the limits of discretionary power or an abuse of such power. It is
very similar to U.S. environmental law studies, where U.S. Courts review
agency action under the arbitrary or capricious standard or review the factfinding of an administrative agency under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the United
States Supreme Court reviewed whether an administrative agency decision
made a clear error of judgment through all relevant factors.41
In Japan, administrative agencies exercise the following powers to
make a disposition: (1) fact-finding, (2) interpretation of the requirements
of disposition, (3) selection of procedures, and (4) timing.42 The Courts
review only the legality, not the validity, of an administrative disposition.
38. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 1961, Showa 50 (Gyo tsu) no. 120,
32(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 1223 (Japan).
39. UGA, supra note 11, at 165.
40. Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No.
59 of 2015, art. 30 (Japan).
41. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
42. UGA, supra note 11, at 161-168; see also SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 7883; see also SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 105-113.
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Administrative discretion, therefore, depends on the administrative
agency’s flexible disposition based on its special expertise.43
In a 1982 decision, the Japanese Supreme Court reviewed Article 30
of the JACLA.44 In this case, a real estate agent entered into a building
contract with a contractor. The contractor asked the business entity of a
specially equipped car to deliver building materials to the building
location. The Vehicle Restriction Ordinance mandated that permission
was needed before a specially equipped car could drive on the road to the
construction site. Although the Nakano ward of Tokyo accepted the
application to use the road, travel was not permitted for six months because
residents living near the building formed a group opposing the
construction, resulting in a conflict. The Nakano ward advised the
applicants to bring the issue before the dispute mediation committee. The
real estate agent brought action against the Nakano ward for damages
caused by delayed permission to travel under the State Redress Act (Kokka
Baishou hou). 45
The Court analyzed the permission requirement in the Vehicle
Restriction Ordinance for traveling on the road with a specially equipped
car and held that such permission was merely an act of confirmation with
no discretionary power of the ward.46 The Court stated that this permission
was allowed to include conditions for individual cases. This decision
shows that administrative agencies may exercise their dispositions based
on objective standards. The agency can exercise administrative
discretionary power unless the Court finds the exercise to be arbitrary and
capricious or so beyond the scope of such power that it is an abuse of
power. The factors relevant to judicial review are violations of purpose,
principles of equality, proportionality, and the infringement of the rights
of citizens.
In a 1972 decision, the Supreme Court issued a ruling on Prime
Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s economic policy for prices.47 The plaintiffs,
residents of Osaka City, deposited money in a postal saving service.
Because the consumer price index increased twenty-six percent from 1972
to 1974, they argued that the value of their deposit decreased as a result of
43. UGA, supra note 11, at 165; see also SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 82-83;
see also SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 111.
44. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 23, 1982, Showa 55 (o) no. 255, 36(4)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 727 (Japan).
45. Kokka Baishou Hou [State Redress Act], Law No. 22 of 1947(Japan).
46. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 23, 1982, Showa 55 (o) no. 255, 36(4)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 727 (Japan).
47. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 1982, Showa 54 (o) no. 579, 136
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 571 (Japan).

2019]

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTIVATION IN JAPAN

63

the actions of the Fair Trade Commission under the Prime Minister’s
economic policy. The Court denied government responsibility under the
State Redress Act, holding that the way economic policy is drafted and
implemented is within the discretionary power and that political
responsibility can be evaluated through elections.48
Administrative agencies exercise their discretionary power not only
through policy-making but also through their expertise. In the case of
nuclear energy plants, discretionary power might be more narrowly
limited; on the other hand, it is possible to regard such power as part of a
judgment of future energy policy.
The Japanese judiciary may review an administrative disposition from
the perspective of the administrative agency. It is similar to the approach
under U.S. environmental law using the arbitrary and capricious standard,
which is also called the “hard look approach.” 49 The judiciary uses
scrutiny to review administrative dispositions, but still defers to its
judgment because of a certain expertise of the agency.50
In the Minamata disease decision, a notorious pollution case in Japan,
the Chisso factory polluted a river with a compound called methyl mercury,
causing disease via the food chain.51 Here, the government did not exercise
its delegated power until the victims cried out. In 2004, the Japanese
Supreme Court found the government liable under the State Redress Act.
The Japanese Court explained that, based on the severe symptoms of the
residents, the agency should have promptly acted to mitigate the pollution.
It issued a temporary injunction to stop further pollution. The victims in this
case suffered from severe diseases and, as a result, were eligible to receive
damages according to a decision made by the Pollution-Related Health
Damage Certification Council (the Council).52
In 2013, one woman applied for damages utilizing the Minamata
disease case findings, but the Council denied her request.53 The Japanese
Court limited the discretionary power of the administrative agency to
48. Id.
49. Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1419, 1420 (1992); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice
and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 483, 514 (1997).
50. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001); see also UGA, supra note 11,
at 325; see also SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 82-83; see also SAKURAI &
HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 111.
51. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] April 15, 1982, Hei 24 (Gyo hi) no. 202, 243
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 329 (Japan).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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confirm a pollution disease diagnosis under the Act on Compensation, etc.
of Pollution-Related Health Damage.54 The Court permitted taking public
health and safety into consideration in reviewing an administrative
disposition.
The Court took a similar approach in the 1992 decision regarding the
Ikata nuclear plant.55 In the Ikata decision, the Shikoku Electric Power
Company planned to construct a nuclear power reactor plant in Ikata cho,
part of the Ehime Prefecture. Shikoku applied to the Prime Minister for a
permit under Article 2356 of the ex-Act on the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material, and Reactors from May of 1972.
The government granted permission for construction in November of
1972. In 1973, the plaintiffs sought revocation of the administrative
disposition that had granted permission to build nuclear reactors under
JACLA. They argued that such permission was substantively and
procedurally illegal and therefore infringed upon public health and
property rights.57
In 1992, the Japanese Supreme Court rejected the local resident’s
arguments.58 The Ikata decision explained that the power of an administrative
agency could be free and discretionary but not unfettered, since it is still
under judicial review. Further, when disposition based on discretionary
power infringes upon human health and safety, the judiciary will strictly
review the disposition. The Court noted that it would respect the expertise
of the administrative agency.59
In supporting its deference to the agency, the Court explained that the
administrative agency examines the safety of reactor facilities including
the technical capabilities as follows:
54. Kougai Kenko Higai no Hoshou tou ni kansuru houritsu [Act on
Compensation, etc. of Pollution-related Health Damage], Law No. 111 of 1973
(Japan).
55. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] Oct. 29, 1992, Showa 60 (Gyo tsu) no.
133, 46(7) SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHŪ] 1174 (Japan). [hereinafter
Ikata decision].
56. Kakugenryo Bussitsu, Kakunenryou Bussitsu oyobi Gensiro no kiseini
kansuru Houritsu [Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear
Fuel Material and Reactors], currently Law No. 42 of 2016. (Japan).
57. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] Oct. 29, 1992, Showa 60 (gyo tsu ) no.
133, 46(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1174 (Japan).
58. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] Oct. 29, 1992, Showa 60 (gyo tsu ) no.
133, 46(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1174 (Japan). During
litigation in 1978, the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear
Fuel Material, and Reactors was revised. The power to grant permission for the
construction of a nuclear power plant was transferred from the Prime Minister to
the Minister of International Trade and Industry.
59. Id.
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[Safety is examined from] a multifaceted and comprehensive
perspective, considering matters such as the engineering safety of
the reactor facilities themselves, the radiation effect on the
workers, neighboring residents and surrounding environment
when the reactors are in normal operation, and the effect on the
neighboring areas in the event of an accident, in connection with
natural conditions of the planned site of reactors (e.g. the land
features, nature of the soil, and weather), social conditions (e.g.
population distribution), and the abovementioned technological
capabilities of the person who is to install the reactors. This
examination also covers matters concerning future forecasts.60
The Court continued:
[The examination] requires comprehensive assessment based on
the latest scientific, expert, and technical knowledge of a
considerably high level, not only in the field of nuclear
engineering but also across a wide range of fields. Article 24 of
the Regulation Act provides that in granting permission for the
installation of reactors, the Prime Minister must hear in advance
the opinion of the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to the
application of the criteria provided in paragraph (1), item (iii) of
said Article (limited to the part concerning technical capabilities)
and in item (iv) of said paragraph, and respect such an opinion.61
The Court emphasized that the Prime Minister had respected the expert,
scientific, and technical knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission. In
the meantime, the Court narrowed its discretion based on scientific expert
perspectives in cases where nuclear reactor accidents occur and public
health and safety are endangered. The judiciary still substantively analyzes
commission review processes regarding specific safety standards. It also
procedurally monitors the investigation, deliberation, and judgment
processes of the commissions utilizing the latest scientific technologies.62
The Ikata decision of 1992 established a framework for the review of
cases involving the safety of nuclear power reactors in Japan. The
judiciary did not use the term scientific “discretion” in its decision,
60. Id. (summarized and translated by author).
61. Id. (summarized and translated by author).
62. SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 82-83; SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note
11, at 110-111, 119; Yishiaki Yamashita, Scientific technology and judicial
review, in Katsuya, Koketsu, et al. Gyoseihou Hanrei Hyakusen, 156-157, Jurist
no. 235 (Yuhikaku 2017).
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probably because it was attempting to distinguish discretion based on
policy from that based on expertise.
Some Japanese environmental law studies regard the Ikata decision as
a matter of policy-making discretion for future energy policy and as a
decision-making process involving a third, independent, non-bureaucratic
committee. In such cases, the judiciary does not make determinations from
the perspective of the administrative agency.63
The Court also noted a burden of proof problem in the 1992 Ikata
decision. Typically, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that an
administrative disposition related to the granting of permission should be
revoked. This was a heavy burden for residents living near the power
plant.64
Thus, the Court asked the administrative agency to prove the
reasonableness of “the specific examination criteria employed in the
investigation and deliberation by the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Reactor Safety Examination Committee, the investigation, deliberation
and assessment process, etc.” Thus, an administrative agency can be
required to submit substantial evidence and materials. If it fails, the Court
will presume that the agency assessment lacked reasonableness.65
The Court gave no indication in the Ikata case of whether the
administrative agency did submit substantial evidence and materials, and
it is still unclear whether or not its judgment was reasonable. The Court
may deny administrative dispositions that are determined to be
unreasonable but may uphold the dispositions of an administrative agency,
in general, based on the scientific knowledge required for judicial
review.66
The Ienaga textbook decision of 1993 reviewed the procedural aspects
of administrative discretionary power.67 The Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science, and Technology, the Textbook Authorization Research
Council (the “Textbook Council”), review textbooks for Japanese
elementary and junior high schools for students aged seven to fifteen,
according to the Articles of the School Education Act (Gakkou Kyouiku
hou). 68
63. UGA, supra note 11, at 165-167; SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 82-83;
SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 118-119.
64. UGA, supra note 11, at 325.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 16, 1993, SHOWA 61 (o) no. 1428, 47(5)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 3483 (Japan).
68. Gakko Kyoiku Hou [School Education Act] (prior to the amendment by
Act No. 48 of 1970), Art. 21(1), and 51 Former Textbook Authorization Ordinance
(Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Ordinance no. 4 of 1948), and the Former
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The Court found clear error in the decision-making process of the
Textbook Council through its investigation, deliberation, and judgment
processes. In the process of authorizing textbooks, certain reasonable
discretionary power is given to the Ministry of Education due to its
academic educational expertise.
In holding the administrative decision to be unlawful, the Court stated
that clear mistakes could not be ignored. 69 The Court reviewed the
Textbook Council’s screening process, which was based on the academic
theories at that time, and overruled the decision rejecting the descriptions
of the textbook. If the Minister of Education made its decision based on
an error, it would be illegal under the State Redress Act.
E. Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion in Japan Today
A 1972 decision centered around a professional cleaner of septic tanks
whose application for permission to operate a business for sewage
treatment was denied.70 The applicant brought an action to revoke the
administrative disposition denying the application. The Japanese Supreme
Court vacated the Tokyo High Court’s decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
The Court explained that the power to approve sewage treatment
businesses was in the hands of the mayor, who had authority to approve
them under the provisions of the Clean Act and the Clean Plan of the
municipality. Sewage plans are the responsibility of municipalities, and
approval of such a business is reviewed to ensure that sewage treatment is
well managed. The Supreme Court recognized the power of the mayor to
interpret the text of the Clean Act for permission purposes.
In a 1954 decision, the Court reviewed the disposition of a matter
involving a student.71 A student in a public university entered a faculty
meeting disputing the layoff of a particular professor. Although the student
was told to leave, he stayed, disrupting the meeting. The president of the
university subsequently expelled him. The Court explained that the
president had discretionary power to choose what type of disposition
would apply to this student.
Textbook Authorization Standards (Public Notice of the Ministry of Education
no. 86 of 1958).
69. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 16, 1993, SHOWA 61 (o) no. 1428, 47(5)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 3483 (Japan).
70. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 12, 1972, SHOWA 43 (Gyot tsu) no. 17,
26(8) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1410 (Japan).
71. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 30, 1954, SHOWA 28 (o) no. 525, 8(7)
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1501 (Japan).
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In a 1977 decision, the Court held that the customs through the
ordinary course of business enabled the business to use discretionary
power to render administrative dispositions. 72 Further, these customs
allowed the business to select procedures for disciplinary dismissals. In
this case, three plaintiffs took on the role of leading the labor union
activities and, in doing so, disrupted the ordinary course of business of the
customs. Their case was dismissed.73
The Court has not chosen between the Kouka Sairyou and Youken
Sairyou theories. Unlike the U.S., Japanese environmental law went
through legal reform after World War II. These decisions may have been
based on mainstream theory prior to the current Constitution known as the
“special power relationship theory.” 74 Under this theory, without
legislation to support it, the government can restrict the freedom or rights
of a person under a special power relationship such as in the case of public
schools or jails, and a remedy from the judiciary is unavailable. Although
it is true that, in the name of discretionary power, these decisions may have
denied or limited the scope of judicial review, a certain kind of special
power relationship may have existed.
F. Purpose Review
The judiciary holds the arbitrary and capricious exercise of
discretionary power of administrative agencies to be illegal. There are
several standards for judicial review of administrative discretion. One such
standard is “purpose review.” These standards are similar to those in the
U.S.
The Court used purpose review in 1978.75 In this case, the plaintiff
applied to Yamagata Prefecture for permission to build private rooms with
baths under the Public Bath Act. 76 At the time, there were business entities
that operated this kind of bath facility for sexual service purposes.77 In
May 1968, citizens initiated a movement against the construction of these
72. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 20, 1977, SHOWA 47 (Gyo tsu) no. 52,
31(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1101 (Japan).
73. Id.
74. Toshiyuki Nonaka, Mutsuo Nakamura et al., Kenpo I [Constitution I] 236
(Yuhikaku, 2012). Yuichiro Tsuji, Reflection of Public Interest in the Japanese
Constitution: Constitutional Amendment, 46 DENVER J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 159
(2018).
75. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] June 16, 1978, Showa 50 (a) no. 24,
32(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 504 (Japan).
76. Koshu Yokujou hou [Public Bath Houses Act], Law No. 139 of 1948.
77. SHIBAIKE, supra note 11, at 82-83; SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note
11, at 66.
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types of buildings. 78 Yome City in Yamagata Prefecture preferred to
establish a public park for children near this site and the Entertainment and
Amusement Trades Control Act79 prohibited private rooms with baths
within 200 metres of such parks. The prefecture approved the city’s
application for a public park within 134 metres from the private rooms in
June 1968. In August, the plaintiff started the business, and in February
1969, the management was suspended and the business was prosecuted.
The Japanese Supreme Court held for the plaintiff.80 The purpose of
the Child Welfare Act was to promote children’s welfare by providing
opportunities for safe and healthy play in a park. The hidden motivation
of the government was to prevent the management of a business for private
rooms with baths. In this case, because there was no necessity in granting
permission for a public children’s park, the plaintiff was entitled to operate
the business.81
III. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN JAPAN AFTER 2011
Nuclear power plant cases illustrate how Japanese Courts review an
administrative agency’s actions, especially when reviewing public health
and safety. People outside Japan might wonder why Japan reactivated its
nuclear power plants after the disaster in 2011.
Prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2010, the Basic Energy
Plan aimed at promoting nuclear power plants from a ratio of 31.3% to
around 50%. As of February 2011, fifty-four nuclear power plants were
working to generate electricity. On the date of the Great East Japan
Earthquake, Units 1–3 of the nuclear power plants were stopped, and Unit
4 experienced a hydrogen explosion, damaging buildings and housing
reactors around it. After the earthquake, Japanese nuclear power plants
were reviewed once every thirteen months. In May 2012, every nuclear
power plant stopped operating at least once in Japan.

78. Id.
79. Fuzoku Eigyou tou no Kisei oyobi Gyoumu no Tekiseika tou ni kansuru
Houritsu [Act on Control and Improvement of Amusement Business, etc], Law
No. 122 of 1948, art. 4 no. 4(1) [art. 28(1) of current revised act].
80. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] June 16, 1978, Showa 50 (a) no. 24,
32(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 504 (Japan).
81. Id.
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A. Government Policy Changes after the Great East Japan Earthquake
In 2012, the parliament amended the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.82 The amendment to
the Act restricted the operational terms of nuclear power plants to forty
years. In September 2012, the Conference on Energy and Environmental
Issues held by the cabinet published a report formulating the strategy on
revolutionary energy and environment.83 It clearly announced that in the
future, society would not depend on nuclear power plants; specifically,
operations limited to forty years should be observed rigidly, and only those
passing the approval of the Nuclear Regulation Authority may be allowed
to be activated again.84 Applicants seeking permission to extend operational
terms would be required to submit reports to the nuclear regulatory
authority.
The industrial world strongly criticized the report.85 Accordingly, the
cabinet could not conclude that it was a cabinet decision but left it as an
advisory report.86 In December 2012, the election of the House of the
Representatives was held, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) gained
power.
The Shinzo Abe cabinet took another look at the agenda of the former
administration’s policy. The LDP changed the previous policy for nuclear
power plant operations. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
initiated discussions on basic energy plans and established a new committee
consisting of experts.
The Abe cabinet announced a Basic Energy Plan in 2014. The plan
minimized dependence on nuclear power but did not abolish it because
nuclear energy was the base of electric power for Japan. The nuclear power
plant, with new safety regulations, would be reactivated.87 The reference

82. Kakugenryo Bussitsu, Kakunenryou Bussitsu oyobi Gensiro no kiseini
kansuru Houritsu [Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear
Fuel Material and Reactors], currently Law No. 42 of 2016. (Japan).
83. CABINET SECRETARIAT, Strategy on revolutionary energy and
environment (Sept. 14, 2012), https://perma.cc/9JH7-9E22 (last visited Feb. 1,
2017).
84. Id.
85. Nikkei Shimbun, Mikiri hassha no genpatu zero [Starting an action
without any consideration for nuclear power plant] (Sept. 19, 2012).
86. Asahi Shimbun, Editorial: Seifu no Dengen rongi [Discussion on power
supply] (Feb. 8, 2015). Nikkei Shimbun, Genpatsu Shinzousetu to meiki
[Providing new nuclear power plant](June 9, 2017).
87. Genkai and Ikata nuclear plants were scheduled to be reactivated by the
end of 2016.
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goal establishes the ratio of renewable power to grow up to twenty percent
by 2030.
The fast-breeder nuclear reactor, Monju, was to be reactivated as a
center of international research. In 2013, around 10,000 defects were
found, and testing was prohibited. In 2016, the Japanese government
decided to abolish this reactor.
B. Monju and Ikata Decisions to Reboot Nuclear Power Plants
The Monju decision is one of the leading cases of nuclear reactor
permission.88 In 1980, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development
Corporation applied to the Prime Minister seeking permission for the
establishment of the Monju reactor, which the Prime Minister granted. The
local residents brought an administrative action to revoke the
administrative disposition and also brought a civil action to seek an
injunction against the building and operation of the Monju reactor. In
1992, the Japanese Supreme Court approved standing of the local residents
and remanded the case to the lower court. In 2005, the Supreme Court
heard the case again and vacated the lower court decision supporting the
illegality of the grant of permission for the Monju reactor.89
The Japanese Supreme Court reviewed several issues, first deciding
that local residents were permitted to bring a suit seeking the revocation
of administrative disposition under Article 9 of JACLA. 90 The Court
explained that the statute provided standing for the revocation of
administrative disposition. Specifically, the term “legal interest” requires
the Court to review purpose, which includes the content and character of
which the statute at issue aims to protect. Further, the Court is required to
examine whether or not the statute at issue protects the concrete interest of
the general public, as well as individual interests.
The Court also decided that a plaintiff may bring a civil suit to seek an
injunction in the interest of a personal right. If the plaintiff brings a civil
suit, administrative litigation is still available. Article 37 91 of JACLA
provides standing to sue in an action for the declaration of nullity, etc. The
Court explained that in this case, the local residents brought a civil action
to seek an injunction; thereby, their civil action was not the equivalent of
88. Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court] Sept. 22, 1992, Heisei 11(Gyo tsu) no.
130 and 131, 46(6) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 571 (Japan)
[hereinafter Monju].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No.
59 of 2015, art. 37 (Japan).
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an administrative litigation under Article 36 92 of JACLA. The Court
explained that it would ask which avenue, civil litigation or administrative
litigation, was direct and appropriate.93 Although a local resident brought
civil action, it did not prohibit administrative litigation.
The Court analyzed the safety review of an administrative agency for
the permission of a nuclear reactor. 94 The Court followed the Ikata
decision of 1992 and decided it was unreasonable to determine all safety
review items.95 Further, the Court should respect the reasonable decision
of its Ministry based on the expert opinions of the Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC). The Act authorizes the Ministry to give permission
and provide judgment because they consider the advisory opinion of the
NSC. The Court defers to the Ministry unless a decision is rendered
unreasonable based on clear, erroneous deliberation and processes within
the NSC.
The justices respected the Ministry’s judgment based on the expert
opinions from professionals in the fields of science and technology. With
respect to safety reviews, the advisory committee reviewed the
measurements for dose reduction in order to avoid potential risks of
nuclear substances emitted by the regular operation of a nuclear plant.96
Further, precautionary measurements were enacted in order to avoid
potential risks of nuclear substances and natural disasters.97 Nonetheless,
the Japanese Supreme Court did not relinquish control over reviewing the
Ministry.
Of utmost concern in this case is how much the Court defers in its
judgment to administrative agency discretion. The answer as to why
judges defer to this source may be expert and democratic accountability.98
In the parliamentary system, the Prime Minister is selected from the
members of the Diet under Article 67(1) 99 and then certified by the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at art. 36.
Monju, supra note 88.
See id. Monju, 61 MINSHŪ at 571.
See Ikata, 46(7) MINSHŪ at 1174.
Monju, 61 MINSHŪ at 571; see also UGA, supra note 11, at 162; see also
SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra note 11, at 110-111.
97. Monju, 61 MINSHŪ at 571; see also YASUTAKA ABE, GYOSEI
HO(JOU), (Administrative law 1) 254-255 (Shinzansha 2015). (Abe strongly
argued that judiciary should exercise strict review without respect of expert
opinion of administrative agency decision.)
98. UGA, supra note 11, at 161-162; see also SAKURAI & HASHIMOTO, supra
note 11, at 104; see also Toshiyuki Nonaka, Mutsuo Nakamura et al., KENPO II
(Constitution II)201 (Yuhikaku, 2012).
99. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], Nov. 3, 1946, art. 67
(Japan).

2019]

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTIVATION IN JAPAN

73

Emperor under Article 7 100 of the Japanese Constitution. The Prime
Minister appoints the Ministry with certification of the Emperor under
Articles 7 and 68(1).101 The certification of the Emperor is ceremonial.
C. Comparison with the Chevron Doctrine and Ikata Again
The U.S. court system and governmental structure significantly differs
from the Japanese system.102 A simple comparison would not be prudent
without addressing the substantial variations between governmental
structures. Nonetheless, the U.S. and the Japanese Supreme Courts do not
fully exercise substantial and procedural review of administrative agency
decisions.
One famous U.S. Supreme Court decision, Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC, is based on deference to the interpretation of law by an
administrative agency (the Chevron doctrine).103 The Chevron doctrine
employs two steps: (1) the Court reviews whether the statutory language
is clear and, if it is, the Courts rejects the administrative agency
interpretation; and (2) if the statute is ambiguous, the Court defers to
administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretation.104
In recent cases, there have been some limitations in the Chevron
doctrine. For example, in Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency,
the Court considered step two of the Chevron doctrine but rejected the
administrative agency’s interpretation.105 It is more difficult to predict how
the Roberts Court will utilize the Chevron doctrine rather than how the
Rehnquist Court adjudicated in the past. There may be a need for future
review of the steps in the Chevron doctrine as the Court reviews additional
interpretations of administrative agencies. There is potential for the U.S.
Supreme Court to modify steps of the Chevron doctrine. Otherwise, the
doctrine might serve as a combination of traditional interpretative tools. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the interpretation of a statute by an administrative
agency changed with a change in presidency.106 The Court applied step
one from the Chevron doctrine.
It appears that both Japanese and U.S. court systems reserve the power
of judicial review, utilizing judicial power to announce what law is
100. Id. at art. 7.
101. Id. at art. 68(1).
102. Shigenori Matsui, Nihonkoku Kenpo [Constitution] 325–26 (Yuhikaku
2007) (Japan).
103. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
104. Id.
105. Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
106. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497
(2007).
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conferred to the judiciary by the Constitution. In both countries, the
concepts of expertise and democratic accountability are legitimized; and,
in the U.S., the Court demonstrated this in the Chevron doctrine.
In the Roberts Court, the Chevron doctrine is seen as winding down
in its development. Accordingly, the Japanese Court cannot solely depend
on expertise and democratic accountability as a means to defer all
judgments to an administrative agency. The judiciary is required to justify
its decisions to the people as a way to secure their trust.
As demonstrated in the U.S. by the Chevron doctrine and the ruling in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the interpretation of a statute by an administrative
agency can change when a new president is elected into office. Similarly,
in Japan, the energy policy changed from the Democratic Party to LDP in
2012; and its effects on the nuclear plant policy were seen by decisions
made under the Abe cabinet.107
In Japan, in terms of democratic legitimacy of the agency, the Diet
established the Nuclear Regulation Authority by statute as an
administrative agency where the cabinet appoints its committee.108 There
are four committee members. The Prime Minister selects the Chairman
who represents the authority with the consent of both Houses of the Diet.109
We may observe a similar process for the head of the administrative
agency, explaining, in part, the democratic legitimacy of an administrative
agency. Both U.S. and Japanese Courts might use a “hard look” approach,
thereby not giving up judicial review that is granted by their respective
Constitutions. As in Massachusetts v. EPA, judges face unfamiliar issues
in areas requiring scientific expertise, with a probability of worst-case
scenarios to determine how much the court defers in matters such as
nuclear power reactor meltdowns.
As noted above, the Japanese Supreme Court hears administrative
litigation where the plaintiff seeks to revoke permission for the
construction of new coal power plants.110 Judicial review is required for
the administrative disposition of whether permission is granted or not. For
permission of coal or nuclear power plants, the electric company needs to
go through an environment assessment for impact. Coal power plants are
required to submit an environmental impact assessment that includes

107. Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai Secchi hō [Act for Establishment of the Nuclear
Regulation Authority], Act no. 47 of 2012.
108. Id. Art. 1 and 5.
109. Id. Art. 6 and 7.
110. Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No.
59, 2015 (Japan), Art. 8.
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alternative plans.111 They must take into consideration the location, size,
structure, and allocation of the building. The Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry (METI) considers the advice of the Ministry of Environment
and reviews the assessment.112 The ministerial ordinance mandates that the
environmental impact assessment provide several alternative proposals in
regards to location, assignment, structure, and scale of the plant. In the
planning phase, factors that may cause significant impacts are to be
selected. The guidelines113 under the administrative regulations exclude
alternative plans for fuels on the ground; specifically, the government
thinks that the fuels would be fixed into one from the perspective of energy
security and management strategy.114
Thus, administrative regulations for coal power plants evaluate any
significant environmental impacts, but not in the case of CO2. By
implementing the best available technology for thermal efficiency, the
guideline of the METI explains that CO2 is not considered in its evaluation.
Today, some nuclear power plants are going through reactivation
reviews, or decisions are being made regarding decommissioning nuclear
reactors. There are exceptions for a few working nuclear power plants,
such as Kawauchi Unit 2 in Kyushu, and Units 3 and 4 of Takahama in
Kansai.
Local citizens recently brought a civil action to seek a provisional
injunction against the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan.115 In
civil actions, local residents seek temporary injunctions against the
operation of coal power plants by asserting that it infringes on both their
personal and environmental rights.116
In January 2018, in the Ikata nuclear power plant case, the Hiroshima
High Court ruled on a request for a provisional injunction against the
111. Kankyo Eikyo Hyouka hou [Environmental Impact Assessment Act],
Law No. 81 of 1997 (Japan), Art.12; see also Denki Jigyou Hou [Electricity
Business Act], Law No. 170 of 1964 (Japan), Art.46-2 to Art.46-22.
112. Report by Working Group on Establishment of Primary Environmental
Impact Consideration, Keikaku Dankai Hairyo Tetuduki ni kakaru gijutsu gaido
[Guideline on Establishment of Primary Environmental Impact Consideration]
(Mar. 2013), page 2; see also ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT DIV., Environmental
Impact Assessment in Japan (May 2012).
113. Id.
114. MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS., Hatsudensho ni kakaru Kankyo
Eikyo Hyouka no tebiki [Guideline on environmental impact assessment for
power plant] (May 2017), https://perma.cc/4YD8-DUQL.
115. Kawakita Shimbun, Sendai PS Unten Sashitome Soshou [Injunction for
Sendai power station] (Dec. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/JA7N-Q86A.
116. Local Consent For Nuclear Plant Restarts, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://perma.cc/LFQ6-X75S.
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operation of Unit 3 of the Ikata nuclear power plant.117 The Hiroshima
High Court recognized potential catastrophic eruption of a volcano near
the nuclear plant stating that a pyroclastic flow by eruption would reach
the Ikata nuclear power plant. The Hiroshima High Court reviewed safety
issues by following a volcano impact assessment guideline, which was
established by the administrative agency. Before this case, the Hiroshima
District Court and the Miyazaki branch of the Fukuoka High Court
rejected the injunction.118
The ministerial guideline estimates the risk of an active volcano within
a radius of 160 kilometers from a nuclear power plant along with the
possibility of volcanic activity. If within range, it presumes the magnitude
of eruption and reviews the probability of pyroclastic flow reaching the
power plant. Volcanologists are concerned with an administrative agency
establishing the volcano impact assessments. While drafting this guideline,
the administrative agency needs to consider expert perspectives, utilizing an
observation network that is able to detect volcanic expansion before
eruption and be able to move nuclear fuel to a safe place. However, other
experts argue that this monitoring may not precisely predict eruption using
today's science and technology. Catastrophic disasters may occur not only
in a nuclear power plant site but also in any site in Japan. It is still unclear
how the Supreme Court in Japan reviews guidelines for a volcano impact
assessment.
Both Japanese and U.S. Courts empower administrative agencies to
exercise discretionary power established by statute. It might be surprising
to review the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Court
concluded that CO2 is an air pollutant.119 Unlike in the U.S., shaping policy
through litigation used to be unfamiliar to Japanese people, who make
decisions on how to assess and accept accidental risk by natural disaster.
People may change governmental policies through voting. Otherwise,
people may bring litigation to the Court to change administrative
dispositions. In this process, the judiciary in Japan is required to show its
authority through its decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011 in
Fukushima, after which nuclear power plants were shut down. People
outside of Japan often wonder why Japan recently reactivated the nuclear
117. Hiroshima Koto Saibansho [Hiroshima High Ct.] Dec. 13, 2017, Heisei
29 (ra) no. 63, 2357 HANREIJIHOU [HANJI] 300 (Japan).
118. Fukuoka Koto Saibansho[Fukuoka High Ct.] Apr. 6, 2015, Heisei 27 (ra)
no. 33, 2290 HANREIJIHOU [Hanji] 20 (Japan).
119. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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power plant, but the explanation can be seen from the perspective of
environmental law.
Administrative discretion is defined as the power and authority of an
administrative agency to set regulatory standards or to make
administrative decisions within the scope set forth in its enabling
legislation or other statutes. The grounds for administrative discretionary
power are agency expertise and policy judgment.
Today, under Article 30 of the JACLA, Japanese Courts can revoke
an original administrative disposition when it exceeds the agency’s
discretionary power or when there is an abuse of such power.120
Studies on Japanese environmental law focus on cases in which
administrative dispositions have been determined by the Courts to be
beyond the limits of discretionary power, or an abuse of such power. It is
very similar to studies on U.S. environmental law, where U.S. Courts use
the Chevron doctrine, or review arbitrary or capricious fact-finding of an
administrative agency under the Administrative Procedure Act.
In the Ikata decision of 1992, the Japanese Supreme Court explained
that the power of an administrative agency could be discretionary, but not
unfettered, as it is still under judicial review.121 Further, when a disposition
based on discretionary power infringes upon human health and safety, the
judiciary will take a hard look at such a disposition. The Court noted that
it would respect the expertise of the administrative agency.
The Ikata decision of 1992 established a framework for the review of
cases involving the safety of nuclear power reactors in Japan. The
judiciary did not use the term scientific “discretion” in its decision,
probably because it was attempting to distinguish discretion based on
policy from that based on expertise.
In 2012, a year after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government
changed its policy on energy and environmental issues. The Abe
government stated that the power plan minimized dependence on nuclear
power, but did not abolish it because the government declared that nuclear
energy was the base of electric power for Japan.122
Recently, local citizens brought a civil action to seek a provisional
injunction against the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan. The
Japanese judiciary is now facing how judges may make policy for the
120. Gyousei Jiken Soshouhou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No.
59 of 2015, art. 30 (Japan).
121. Abe, supra note 97, at 254-56. (Abe strongly argued administrative
discretion is under judicial review. The Judiciary should review the fact finding
of an administrative agency if it is related to human health.)
122. AGENCY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY, Cabinet Decision on
the New Strategic Energy Plan, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
(July 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/K3ET-69MW (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
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future of energy in part and allocate burdens of proof to citizens or
administrative agencies. It is easy for judges to say that science is beyond
their understanding, as the risk of volcanic eruption is based on research
of seismologists.
Judges should not make policy judgments and may defer to the
expertise of administrative agencies, as it is not common for litigation to
shape policy in Japan. Nonetheless, judges are still obligated to review
safety standards and damage to the lives and health of the people. Japanese
administrative law researchers and legal professionals need to remain
vigilant in policing the proper role of Japan’s judiciary.
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